Mandatory Access Obligations and Standing by Picker, Randal C.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2006
Mandatory Access Obligations and Standing
Randal C. Picker
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Randal C. Picker, "Mandatory Access Obligations and Standing," 31 Journal of Corporation Law 387 (2006).
Mandatory Access Obligations and Standing
Randal C. Picker*
I. IN TRO D UCTION ........................................................................................................ 387
II. A Q UICK TOUR OF THE CASES ................................................................................. 388
III. ENFORCING A CCESS RIGHTS .................................................................................... 392
IV. MATCHING THE MODEL AND THE LAW .................................................................... 396
A. Integrating Antitrust Substantive Law and the 1996 Act .................................... 396
B . Standing .............................................................................................................. 397
V . C O N CLU SIO N ........................................................................................................... 400
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's January 2004 decision in the Trinko case I was eagerly
awaited by both the antitrust and telecommunications bars. The case focused on the
intersection of antitrust law and the Telecommunications Act of 1996.2 Antitrust law is
supremely concerned with competition, and the heart of the 1996 Act was its effort to
create meaningful competition in local telecommunications. 3 The Court had already
wrestled twice with the 1996 Act's competition structure in Iowa Utilities4 and Verizon,
5
but neither of those had required consideration of antitrust law.
Plus, Trinko was a twofer. Not only did it pose the intersection questions just
described, but it raised interesting substantive and standing issues. The 1996 Act creates a
mandatory dealing regime for local telecommunications companies. Antitrust has its own
flavors of mandatory dealing obligations, captured most directly by the Supreme Court in
Terminal Railroad,6 Associated Press,7 and Aspen Skiing.8 How the Court would
* Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago Law School and Senior
Fellow, The Computation Institute of the University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory. A prior
version of this paper was presented in December 2002 at a conference at the Center for the Digital Economy at
the Manhattan Institute under the name Understanding Statutory Bundles: Does the Sherman Act Come with the
1996 Telecommunications Act?. I thank the Paul Leffmann Fund, The Russell J. Parsons Faculty Research Fund
and the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at The University of Chicago Law School for their
generous research support, and through the Olin Program, Microsoft Corporation and Verizon.
1. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
2. Id. at 405-07.
3. For skeptical commentary about the utility of the Supreme Court's efforts in those cases, see Douglas
Lichtman & Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications: Iowa Utilities and Verizon, 2002
SuP. CT. REV. 41.
4. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
5. Verizon Commc'ns v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
6. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
7. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
8. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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confront those doctrines was likely to be interesting in and of itself, and the standing
issues in Trinko might force the Court to revisit its important analysis in Illinois Brick9 of
how we should allocate the right to sue between purchasers and indirect purchasers. The
lower court case law-in particular, Goldwasser,10 Covad,11 and the Second Circuit
opinion in Trinkol 2-had provided an interesting range of thoughts on these questions
and therefore the Supreme Court had a great deal to work with.
In this Article, I consider the standing question. Trinko resolves some core
substantive questions about mandatory dealing in antitrust. Well, not really, or perhaps,
not really; we will be fighting about what Trinko actually said for some time. 13 But
Trinko certainly addresses quite directly the mandatory dealing issue, at least in the
context of the 1996 Act, and we and the lower courts will have to figure out what
propositions Trinko stands for. But that is not my mission here. Given its substantive
resolution of Trinko, the majority opinion did not need to resolve the standing issue, and
we get few freebies from the Court these days. 14 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Souter and Thomas, addressed standing in his opinion concurring in the judgment,
concluding that the consumer customer should not be found to have standing to address
the scope of the mandatory dealing obligation.
That is the question I consider in this Article. Part II briefly describes some of the
relevant case law. Part III presents a simple model of the social welfare consequences of
an access breach and various approaches to assigning lawsuit rights to entrants and
consumers. Part IV matches up the results of the model with how the substantive law of
antitrust and the 1996 Act interact together and with standing rules for
telecommunications and antitrust. In particular, Part IV matches the model with the
antitrust doctrine in Illinois Brick, which bars consumers from suing their remote
sellers-typically manufacturers, but here possibly the local exchange carrier required by
the 1996 Act to give access to unbundled network elements.
II. A QUICK TOUR OF THE CASES
To plunge in and set the scene quickly, consider the three key courts of appeals
decisions that set up the Supreme Court's consideration of Trinko. In mid-2000, the
Seventh Circuit issued its decision in Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp. 15 In Goldwasser,
consumer plaintiffs brought a class action complaint against their local phone
company. 16 The complaint set forth twenty alleged violations of the 1996 Act. 17 These
were alleged as violations of the Act itself, and without more, as violations of section 2 of
9. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
10. Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000).
11. Covad Commc'ns v. Bellsouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11 th Cir. 2002).
12. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002).
13. See generally John Thorne, A Categorical Rule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Verizon v.
Trinko, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 289 (2005); Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a
Deregulatory Era, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-814945.
14. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 416 n.5 (2004).
15. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 390.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 394.
[Winter
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the Sherman Act, which bars monopolization and attempted monopolization. 18 The
plaintiffs sought treble damages for the Sherman Act violations and declaratory and
injunctive relief.19 The district court dismissed the complaint under the filed rate
doctrine, which, under certain circumstances, prohibits inquiry into rates authorized by a
regulator,20 and for lack of antitrust standing.
2
'
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 22 The court noted that while antitrust
does impose some obligations on an incumbent to deal with other firms-seen most
notably in Terminal Railroad23 and Aspen Skiing 24 -those duties are relatively
limited. 25 In contrast, the 1996 Act creates broad sharing obligations based on status-as
a local exchange carrier or an incumbent local exchange carrier-without regard to any
showing of monopolization under section 2. Regardless of one's views of the
controversial essential facilities doctrine, 26 there is little doubt that the detailed access
obligations of the 1996 Act go far beyond whatever access rights exist under the antitrust
laws, as the Seventh Circuit quickly found. Therefore, a simple allegation of a violation
of the access rules of the 1996 Act, without more, insufficiently alleged a violation of the
Sherman Act.
The Seventh Circuit went on to consider whether a properly alleged essential
facilities claim could be maintained notwithstanding the 1996 Act.2 7 The plaintiffs
alleged that they had indeed made out such claims. 28 The court held that access
obligations imposed through antitrust litigation could conflict with those imposed under
the Act by state commissions or the FCC and that the more specific regulations set forth
in the 1996 Act took "precedence over the general antitrust laws." 29 The Seventh Circuit
noted that the antitrust savings clause contained in the Act 30 would also operate where
less detailed regulation posed less potential for conflict between the antitrust laws and the
1996 Act.3 1
The Second Circuit jumped in mid-2002 in its decision in Trinko.32 AT&T had
entered into an interconnection agreement with NYNEX pursuant to section 252 of the
1996 Act. 33 That agreement, which was approved by a New York state commission,
34
18. Id. at 394-95.
19. Id. at 395.
20. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 395-96; Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409
(1986) (reaffirming the filed rate doctrine established in Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. R.R. Co., 260 U.S. 156
(1922)).
21. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 395-96.
22. Id. at 402.
23. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
24. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
25. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 390.
26. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841
(1990); Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal-Why Aspen and
Kodak are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659 (2001).
27. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 401.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2004) (historical and statutory notes).
31. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 401.
32. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002).
33. Id. at 94.
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contained a dispute resolutions clause setting forth the "exclusive remedy" for violations
of the agreement. 35 AT&T soon alleged breach, and on March 9, 2000, Bell Atlantic-
NYNEX's successor after a merger-entered into a consent decree regarding the alleged
violations. 36 Additionally, it paid $3 million to the United States and $10 million to
AT&T and other competitors for losses. 37
Soon after that, Trinko filed a class action against Bell Atlantic-now Verizon after
a merger with GTE-alleging violations of the 1996 Act and the Sherman Act. 38 The
district court dismissed the case based on a conflict between the antitrust laws and the
1996 Act, and on the view that Trinko was seeking to assert rights that belonged to
AT&T. 39 On appeal to the Second Circuit, a number of issues were raised, most of which
are not the focus of this Article and which I shall therefore ignore. 40 The Second Circuit
turned to whether Trinko could satisfy the rules for antitrust standing under the doctrine
of Illinois Brick, which announced a rule barring indirect purchasers from pursuing
antitrust claims against their indirect sellers-for example, a consumer buying from a
retailer would not have antitrust standing to sue the manufacturer. 4 1 I pursue that issue in
more detail below. On the antitrust claims themselves, the Second Circuit found that
Trinko had alleged independent antitrust claims-that is, claims that did not allege
antitrust violations merely because of violations of the interconnection rules of the 1996
Act. That distinguished Trinko from Goldwasser, where the antitrust claims were purely
derivative of the 1996 Act.
This therefore squarely presented a situation where the same conduct might violate
both the antitrust laws and the 1996 Act. Under prior Second Circuit case law, the court
would not find implicit immunity through the 1996 Act from the antitrust laws absent
"plain repugnancy." 42 And for the court to reach that conclusion, it would have to do so
in the face of a specific savings clause contained in the 1996 Act: "Nothing in this Act or
the amendments made by this Act ... shall be construed to modify, impair or supercede
the applicability of any of the antitrust laws." 43 The Second Circuit concluded that the
specific savings clause makes the plain repugnancy notion an uphill fight.
The Second Circuit then considered the question of how antitrust remedies might
intersect with the 1996 Act. The court saw damages in favor of consumers such as Trinko
as unproblematic, as damages create no conflicting requirements. Indeed, the court
34. Order Approving Interconnection Agreement, Petition of AT&T Commc'ns of N.Y. for Arbitration of
an Interconnection Agreement with N.Y. Tel. Co., Case 96-C-0723 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n June 13, 1997),
1997 WL 410707.
35. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 94.
36. Id. at 95.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 96.
40. These included whether Trinko had standing under the Communications Act to assert alleged
violations of the anti-discrimination provisions of section 202 of that Act-the Second Circuit found that he
did-and whether Trinko had standing to assert an alleged violation of section 251, where the court avoided the
standing question as it concluded that the defendant had complied with section 251 in entering into an
interconnection agreement with AT&T.
41. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
42. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 109.
43. 47 U.S.C. § 152 hist. n.5 (2004) (discussing the applicability of consent decrees and other related law).
[Winter
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viewed damages to Triako as useful "consumer compensation" absent under the 1996
Act. 4 4 In contrast, the court saw injunctive remedies under the antitrust laws as possibly
creating conflicts with the statutory interconnection requirements of the 1996 Act and
thus urged "particular judicial restraint." 45 Finally, the court made clear that it was not
addressing the power of a potential entrant to pursue antitrust claims. 4 6 Instead, at the
close of Trinko, we have consumers positioned to pursue antitrust claims and potential
entrants proceeding under the interconnection regime of the 1996 Act.
One week later, in Covad Communications Co. v. Bellsouth Corp. ,47 the Eleventh
Circuit held that an entrant could sue under both the 1996 Act and antitrust law for
alleged breaches of interconnection duties. Covad properly alleged a series of antitrust
claims-essential facilities, refusal to deal, and a price squeeze-and the key question
was whether those claims were preempted by the 1996 Act. The court followed the
analysis in Trinko, by requiring plain repugnancy and performing the savings clause
analysis, then added a tour of the legislative history and rejected the analysis in
Goldwasser to the extent that it conflicted with the analysis in Covad.
The Supreme Court took the Trinko case, and the majority opinion by Justice Scalia
focused on the substance of mandatory dealing obligations. These obligations have had a
checkered history in the Supreme Court. The 1912 Terminal Railroad case 48 is
frequently described as the genesis of the essential facilities doctrine, but the Court never
used that phrase in the case itself, as Justice Scalia was quick to remind us in Trinko.
49
Yet Terminal Railroad did indeed order the robber baron Jay Gould to open the St. Louis
terminals and bridges to outside railroads or face a break-up order. The 1945 Associated
Press case effectively forced the AP to deal with newspapers that the association had
previously excluded. 50 And, most famously (or infamously), Aspen Skiing ordered the
dominant ski manager in Aspen to deal with its smaller competitor.51
But, at a minimum, the Trinko majority shows no taste for moving beyond these
cases in crafting a mandatory dealing duty from the bar against monopolization set forth
in section 2 of the Sherman Act. The majority made that clear by describing Aspen as "at
or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability."'52 Trinko understood Aspen to turn on the
history of voluntary dealing between the mountain ski resort competitors in Aspen, and
that is certainly a fair reading of the case. In contrast, in Trinko itself, the complaint in the
case had not alleged prior voluntary dealing by Verizon with AT&T, and indeed, the
purpose of the 1996 Act was to force the reluctant local phone companies to open their
networks to competitors.
Moreover, as the majority emphasized, the 1996 Act created its own, quite elaborate
set of mandatory dealing obligations. Getting those obligations right has turned out to be
44. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 110.
45. Id. at 111.
46. Id. at 112 n.19.
47. Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bellsouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (1I1th Cir. 2002), vacated in light of Verizon
Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), and on remand, 374 F.3d 1044,
1046 (11 th Cir. 2004) (finding antitrust claim foreclosed by Trinko 's interpretation of Aspen Skiing).
48. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
49. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.
50. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
51. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
52. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
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nothing short of a Sisyphean task-two trips to the Supreme Court, multiple trips to
courts of appeals, sets and sets of complex rules, and ongoing litigation. And yet the
question remains: what role, if any, should the thin mandatory dealing obligation of
antitrust play on top of the 1996 Act's scheme? It is hardly surprising that a majority
already hostile to antitrust's version of mandatory dealing would conclude that enough
was enough. 53
But, for this Article at least, standing is the issue of interest, and as already noted,
the Trinko majority did not need to confront the standing question, having already
resolved the substantive antitrust question in Verizon's favor.54 But three justices,
concurring in the judgment, believed that the case should have been decided in favor of
Verizon based on standing. Trinko, after all, was just one of AT&T's customers. The
access obligations, whatever their content, ran in favor of AT&T and not Trinko. As a
result, said Justice Stevens, "whatever antitrust injury respondent suffered because of
Verizon's conduct was purely derivative of the injury that AT&T suffered. ' 55
III. ENFORCING ACCESS RIGHTS
Whether Justice Stevens was right is the question. As a matter of first principles, it is
hard to understand why we could not apply both the 1996 Telecommunications Act and
the Sherman Act. Actually, that formulation is a little crude, though it captures the spirit
of the idea. Imagine access regulations consisting of detailed statutory mandates coupled
with general fill-in powers. We normally understand fill-in powers to reflect the
considerable costs of specifying ex ante rules that will apply to difficult-to-imagine future
states of the world. We legislate in specifics for the things that we understand now and
build in flexibility to address changes in the future. This is a conventional way of
describing incomplete contracts written by private parties. We might also understand
general powers to allow legislative deals to be reached when there might not be
agreement on more specific language, where each side is betting on how the regulator
will interpret the language. 56
Note that, put this way, we have said nothing about who should make decisions
about implementing this mixed scheme of general and specific statutory mandates. One
regulator? Two? A mix of federal and state regulators? Courts? Private plaintiffs? These
are obviously very broad questions that go far beyond the limited aims of this Article. So,
to track the issues in the cases, I focus on private plaintiffs and consider two natural
candidates: the blocked competitor and consumers.
The competitor who does not receive access may or may not suffer lost profits.
53. Id. at 412.
One factor of particular importance is the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter and
remedy anticompetitive harm. Where such a structure exists, the additional benefit to competition
provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the
antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny.
Id.
54. Id. at 416 n.5.
55. Id. at 417.
56. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995) (describing the
pervasiveness of incompletely theorized agreements in Anglo-American law).
[Winter
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Consumers may be harmed as well, as consumer surplus might be higher absent the
access breach. Some harmed consumers will be those who actually consume the end
product. These inframarginal consumers get as much of the good as they would have
absent the breach, but they pay more for the good because of the reduction in competition
caused by the access breach. From a social standpoint, we need to have a distributional
metric to assess these consumers, as output has not changed for them and we have just
transferred value from these consumers to the incumbent. We have a second group of
consumers as well. These are consumers who would have purchased the good at the
lower prices that would have resulted from competition under the mandated access.
It might help to have a little toy model to play with to talk through these issues.
Consider an industry with a demand curve given by p = z - q. This obviously is just a
very simple linear demand curve. Assume that the incumbent has a fixed marginal cost of
c to produce each unit of the good in question. The incumbent has a blocking position, so
absent an entrant gaining access to the incumbent's technology, the incumbent will have
a monopoly. If the incumbent monopolist maximizes profits, with a little math, we have
enough information to calculate profits (H) and consumer surplus (CS). These are given
by:
rim = 1/4(z - c)2 , CS" = 118(z - c)' 1
Overall social welfare is just the sum of the two.
Now let us make it possible for entry by giving the entrant access to the relevant
technology at a per unit cost of p. As is standard, we now need to make some
assumptions about how the incumbent and the potential entrant will interact: whether the
resulting competition will be over price (Bertrand competition) or quantity (Coumot
competition), and whether it will be simultaneous or in sequence (Stackelburg
competition). These are standard questions for industrial organization models of
competition, but for now assume Cournot competition. Note that entry means that the
incumbent has two sources of revenue: from consumers through sales in the product
market and from the entrant through per unit input sales.
With a little more math, we can come up with more results. Start with the quantities
that will be selected by the incumbent and the entrant:
qi = 1/3(z + pa - 2c), q, = 1/3(z + c - 2p) (2)
We know, of course, that the access price will alter the entrant's quantity, but note
the way in which it also alters the incumbent's final quantity. The incumbent's output is
increasing in the access price. Higher access prices discourage entry, creating greater
space for the incumbent to produce.
Turn next to profits and consumer surplus. These are fairly complex, so it might help
to focus on a special case, namely where the regulator sets the price of access equal to the
marginal cost (p, = c). Note that in that case, the incumbent and the entrant produce the
same amount, as they face the same costs and the sales to the entrant are neither a source
of profit nor of loss for the incumbent. Profits for the incumbent and the entrant and
consumer surplus are given by:
2006]
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n
i 
= I /9(z - C)2, ie = I/9(z - c) 2, CS = 2/9(z - C)2 (3)
In some sense, what we most care about are the changes relative to the first
situation. Those are given by:
Aln = -5/36(z - c) 2, AI, = I /9(z - c)2 , ACS = 7/72(z - c)2  (4)
Together this gives the increase in overall social welfare that results from Cournot
entry, resulting in a duopoly when the access price is set at marginal cost:
ASWF = 5/72(z - c)2  (5)
Consumer surplus is up, profits are down, and social welfare rises, though by less
than the amount of the increase in consumer surplus. Some of the increase in consumer
surplus arises from the additional consumers served with more competition. Another
chunk of it is just a transfer away from producers to consumers. If we treat consumers
and producers equally in calculating social welfare, the transfer does not add to social
welfare; only the additional output actually increases social welfare. Note also that entry
transfers profits away from the incumbent to the entrant, but, as just noted, competition
reduces overall profits to the benefit of consumers.
What does all of this say about our enforcement questions on access? We need to
know what we are trying to accomplish. On these assumptions, we should expect the
potential entrant to sue if the incumbent fails to comply with its access obligations,
assuming of course that the cost of litigating is less than the lost profits the entrant
suffers. Indeed, within the toy model, the potential entrant has a slightly stronger
incentive to sue than the consumers (all of 1/72's difference to be sure). If what we want
is specific enforcement of the access obligation, we do not necessarily need both the
entrant and the consumers to sue. One mechanism of enforcement may suffice, and all
parties would benefit from the enforcement.
That, of course, suggests that there could be a free-rider problem associated with
enforcement resulting in specific performance. If we start to factor some chance of legal
error, consumers might elect not to bring suit on the hopes that the entrant would pursue
its remedies and the entrant might do the same. Of course, one way to solve the free-rider
problem in that situation is to bar either the entrant or the consumers from bringing suit.
If consumers were barred from asserting rights-again, either rights under the 1996 Act
or the antitrust laws-we would concentrate the incentive to sue in the potential entrants,
though we might need to worry about collective action in that group as well.
In contrast, if the goal of enforcement is at least partially compensatory, then just
allowing one suit would be a mistake. The entrant has lost profits from the wrongful
denial of access, while the consumers have lost consumer surplus. The wrongful denial of
access harms both parties, and, as a general matter, when a single act hurts multiple
parties, each person gets to sue for their losses. This situation is particularly relevant here,
where the possibility of profits is precisely what induces entry-exactly what the 1996
Act seeks to encourage-and the consumer surplus that flows to consumers from entry is
one of the core aims of the Act. The 1996 Act seeks to foster entry to push the benefits of
competition to consumers and to minimize the need to regulate prices in the retail market.
[Winter
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Other than getting benefits to consumers, there is little reason to embrace the elaborate
access rules of the 1996 Act.
Another possible goal is to deter ex ante breach by incumbents through the threat of
ex post damages. To return to Justice Stevens's opinion concurring in the judgment in
Trinko, would we achieve that if only AT&T could sue in Trinko and it could only assert
its damages? Quite plausibly not. Look at the formulations in equation (4). The
incumbent loses more from competition than the entrant gains (a difference of 1/36 times
the squared term). The incumbent could afford to pay the entrant's damages and have
money left over. This just reflects the fact that as between the incumbent and the entrant,
the incumbent's breach is efficient. The incumbent and the entrant do not want to
compete since the benefits only flow to the consumers. In that framework, the
interconnection agreement and its breach simply operate as a mechanism for dividing up
the monopoly rents. Suits by consumers alone would not suffice either, as the incumbent
loses more from competition than the consumers gain (a difference of 3/72 times the
squared term). We actually need the threat of both suits to deter the breach (or at least the
threat that both harms will be asserted).
An alternative approach would be to focus on the extra profits obtained by the
incumbent from the access breach and require disgorgement. If we were merely seeking
to deter the access breach and were not focusing on compensation to those harmed by the
breach, we could assign the right to enforce that remedy to almost anyone. In reality, we
would naturally look to entrants, consumers, or regulators. Entrants may have the best
information about whether a breach has taken place. After all, they are squarely in the
middle of trying to make the access right work, and also have an insider's knowledge of
the business. Regulators might see multiple alleged breaches across many cases, and thus
would have a large numbers advantage in assessing access breakdowns. Consumers
would seem to be the least well situated to enforce a disgorgement remedy. They lack
direct knowledge of the interaction between the incumbent and the entrant, are not
particularly knowledgeable about the operation of the industry, and may see only one
case ever.
Whether we would require a multiplier d la antitrust treble damages depends on
what we are trying to accomplish. It would be foolish to take on in this Article the large
question of the merits of punitive damages. 57 Consider the under-detection rationale for
punitive damages, namely, that imperfect detection of violations creates an incentive to
breach even in the face of a disgorgement remedy, since some of the time the breacher
will get away with it. Damage multiplying-treble damages or punitive damages
generally-might adjust for that under-detection to restore a sufficient ex ante penalty to
deter breach. 58
We should think the under-detection rationale has little role to play here, suggesting
little reason for damage multipliers. Entrants should naturally detect breaches. They are
calling the incumbent day by day to gain access to lines and other unbundled network
elements. To be sure, the entrants may face some uncertainty, but this could just as easily
57. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 869 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998).
58. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 646 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing along these same lines for antitrust treble damages).
2006]
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result in too many claims for breach as in too few.
Here is what all of this suggests. If we are only looking for an injunction ordering
performance of the access right, we can assign the right to sue to either the entrant or the
consumers. It may make sense to assign it to one or the other to avoid free-riding issues,
as the entrant is almost certainly better situated to know whether an access breach has
taken place. If we are looking to deter breach through disgorgement, and if we believe
that avoiding multiple liability is important-as we often do 59-we should again assign
the right to sue to the entrant because it has better information. In the alternative, we
could deter breach and compensate those harmed by the access breach by allowing the
entrant to sue for lost profits and the consumers to sue for lost consumer surplus. At least
within the confines of the model, these amounts are quite distinct and readily separable.
Nothing in the analysis suggests a role for damage multipliers based on the need to gross
up damages to adjust for undetected breaches, as we should expect entrants to catch
breaches in ordinary course.
IV. MATCHING THE MODEL AND THE LAW
The discussion so far has been fairly abstract. The model in Part III traces the
consequences of an "access breach," which results in less competition than would
otherwise take place, and assesses ways of (1) calculating damages or penalties,
depending in part on whether we are seeking to compensate those harmed or seeking to
deter breaches from occurring in the first place; and (2) assigning enforcement rights
depending on which policy goals we are trying to accomplish. Both the incumbent and
the entrant can set price to consumers, though I did treat the access price by the entrant as
being set by regulators. We next consider how this abstract setup matches with the
substantive law of access and standing doctrine.
A. Integrating Antitrust Substantive Law and the 1996 Act
Goldwasser, Trinko, and Covad consist of the standard antitrust claim soup, a mix of
ingredients thrown together in the hopes that something good will result. Goldwasser
seemingly stated no independent antitrust claims, apparently in the hope that he could
make the possibly easier showing of a breach of the 1996 Act's access rules and then
morph that into an antitrust violation. The Seventh Circuit appropriately saw through
that: access "rights" under the antitrust laws are notoriously difficult to pin down, require
a substantial showing of market power, and typically depend on the existence of an
essential facility. The 1996 Act merely imposes access rights on an assortment of local
exchange carriers, so there is a large difference between the substantive antitrust doctrine
of access and that under the 1996 Act.
Of course, Goldwasser only pled poorly, or more likely, strategically. Trinko did
better, or at least the Second Circuit thought he did. The court saw in the complaint a
possible essential facilities claim and a possible monopoly leveraging claim. Certainly, a
careful complaint could allege an essential facilities claim, as such claims have succeeded
59. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue
Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 602 (1979),
and the cases cited therein.
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before when telecommunications entrants have sought access to an incumbent's
facilities. 60 The monopoly leveraging claim turns on the idea that Bell Atlantic had
monopoly power in the wholesale market for local loop access and that it was seeking to
leverage that power into a competitive advantage in the retail market.
Finally, Covad adds to the essential facilities claims a distinct refusal to deal claim
based upon alleged denied access and a price squeeze claim based on wholesale prices
that were alleged to be impermissibly high. The refusal to deal claim emerges from the
fact that in Aspen Skiing the Supreme Court specifically disclaimed reliance on the
essential facilities doctrine in finding that Aspen Skiing had a duty to deal with its
competitor. 6 1 As if one uncertain antitrust access doctrine was not enough!
We should consider the ways in which these antitrust claims might conflict with the
1996 Act. For our purposes, the independent antitrust status of these claims probably
should not matter too much. So, for example, whether monopoly leveraging is or is not a
good antitrust doctrine is separate and apart from how it should intersect with the 1996
Act. Our concern should be the way in which enforcing otherwise applicable antitrust
doctrines might undercut the operation of the section 251 access rules.
As suggested above, I find no conceptual conflict between the detailed access rules
of section 251 and the contingent, general access rules of antitrust law. In the law, we
often set forth a series of particular rules and confer on an authority-be it court or
regulator-the ability to fill in gaps. When we do that, we routinely face the issue of how
to police the regulators to ensure that they are honestly filling in the terms of the
intentionally incomplete scheme set forth by Congress and not overturning that scheme.
But Trinko has clearly limited the role that antitrust access doctrines will play in
telecommunications: "The 1996 Act's extensive provision for access makes it
unnecessary to impose a doctrine of forced access." 62 That should resolve this issue
under the 1996 Act, and the fighting issues are the next steps. Does the analysis carry
over to other areas in which there are extensive statutory or regulatory obligations to deal,
say, in electricity? Does Trinko draw a line in the sand-perhaps, more appropriately, a
line in the snow--on Aspen's analysis? For this Article, these are issues for another day.
B. Standing
Let us turn instead to standing. Part III of this Article focused on the consequences
of an access breach. Quite intentionally, nothing in that analysis turns on the source of the
duty, that is, whether the access obligation flows from antitrust law or from the 1996 Act.
The lost profits and consumer surplus follow from the denial of access that allows the
monopoly to continue.
We have two standing questions to consider. The first is purely internal to
telecommunications law. Namely, who has standing to assert claims for violations of the
interconnection rules set forth in section 251? The analysis in Part III suggests that
standing rules should follow quickly once we figure out our general approach to remedies
for access breaches. There is little reason to think that that analysis should not carry over
as well to telecommunications law proper. That is not my focus here, so I will not pursue
60. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
61. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611 n.44 (1985).
62. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004).
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it, especially since the appellate court opinion in Trinko made clear that the statutory and
doctrinal issues are not simple.
So let us turn instead to the antitrust standing rule set forth in Illinois Brick. That
case bars indirect purchasers from pursuing antitrust actions "up the chain," so that a
consumer buying from a retailer who in turn had purchased from a manufacturer could
not sue the manufacturer. Illinois Brick meshes with Hanover Shoe63 in which the
Supreme Court held that a defendant in an antitrust action could not bar a claim on the
basis that the overcharged plaintiff had been able to "pass on" the overcharges to its
customers and hence had suffered no damages from the antitrust violation.
The rule in Illinois Brick is typically defended as avoiding the risk of multiple
liability. 64 At least within the stark confines of the model here, we do not face that
problem. We can cleanly separate out the lost profits that a potential entrant will suffer
from the reduction in consumer surplus inflicted on consumers who lose the benefit of
competition between the incumbent and the entrant.
In Trinko, the Second Circuit noted that the interconnection cases present a different
setting than that usually addressed by Illinois Brick. AT&T did purchase inputs from Bell
Atlantic, but it was not "solely" a customer of Bell Atlantic. Instead, local loop access in
hand, AT&T immediately competed with Bell Atlantic. 65 This sufficed, in the Second
Circuit's view, to take Trinko outside of Illinois Brick so as to permit Trinko to satisfy the
standard for antitrust standing. Again, in the Supreme Court, the majority opinion pushed
the standing issue to one side to take on the direct question of substantive antitrust law.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Thomas, addressed the standing question
and concluded that Trinko lacked standing.
The conventional defense of Illinois Brick focuses on the expected behavior of the
firm purchasing the input, which is then resold to consumers. The purchasing firm
realizes that it is being overcharged-that each purchase brings with it treble damages
which therefore effectively lowers the price of the input-and that competition among
input purchasers pushes the benefits of the damages claim to consumers. 66 The success
of this mechanism obviously depends on a fine sense of how antitrust works--"oh good,
we have noticed that they are overcharging us, so go buy more and announce a sale price
for our customers"-but there is a more basic point as we try to carry this analysis to the
interconnection access rules.
This vision of Illinois Brick assumes ready access to the input. The whole point of
the 1996 Act's interconnection rules is that entrants have a hard time obtaining access. In
the extreme case, the denial of access is total and no damages are passed to consumers
who buy from the entrant because there is no entrant and there are no sales by the entrant.
In the less extreme case, the denial of access is at least partial. Moreover, in the situation
addressed by the 1996 Act, competition is minimal, so there may be no pressure to pass
on damages to customers, plus it is uncertain whether the entrant can actually assert
antitrust damages at all. Put slightly differently, this is not an overcharge situation. To the
extent that the entrant is able to get access, the price of access will be set pursuant to the
63. Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
64. See Landes & Posner, supra note 59.
65. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP v. Bell Ad. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 106 (2d Cir. 2002).
66. See Landes & Posner, supra note 59, at 605-06.
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pricing rules of section 252 as implemented by state public utility commissions. And that
price may very well be protected from inquiry under the filed-rate doctrine.
We should step back to see how well this analysis meshes with Supreme Court
doctrine, especially as seen in the Court's last extended look at Illinois Brick, which came
in Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc.67 In that case, the Court declined to carve out an
exception to the general rule in Illinois Brick for regulated industries. Kansas and
Missouri sought to assert parens patriae claims on behalf of residential consumers who
bought natural gas from regulated public utilities. The states argued that the utilities
passed through one hundred percent of their costs, and hence, if natural gas producers had
overcharged the utilities, consumers should recover.
The states also argued that the harms to the utilities and the consumers were
separable, and therefore there was no risk of multiple recoveries. The Court declined to
consider that point, believing that the additional litigation burdens of allowing more
parties dwarfed any possible benefit of doing so. 68 That was especially true, in the
Court's view, as the new litigants who would be added under the proposed exception-
consumers-lacked expertise and experience. 69
Finally, the Court saw a substantial burden in embracing a case-by-case, industry-
by-industry inquiry into whether Illinois Brick would apply. The core point of Illinois
Brick was to simplify already complex antitrust litigation. Any exception to the rule
would require a substantial inquiry as to whether the exception had been met or not, and
that would increase the burden on the courts and on litigants.
I am not sure that there is a particularly good response to that. There might be much
to be said in favor of a "balanced budget" approach to doctrinal wrinkles: So you want to
add an exception to Illinois Brick? That will increase burdens on courts and litigants, so
what other doctrine are you willing to give up to pay for the new wrinkle? It is folly to
think that we can continually add doctrinal refinements and not suffer any cost-either
direct litigation costs or error costs-from the increased complexity. That is the Court's
essential message in Utilicorp United, and I am hard-pressed to believe that the Court is
wrong.
It may be too slick a response to say that we can avoid that here by treating the issue
in Trinko as being about telecommunications standing. The idea would be to leave
Illinois Brick alone in antitrust, but when we approach the question of standing proper in
telecommunications, ignore the underlying message of the Illinois Brick cases and allow
both entrant and consumers to sue. It is perhaps fair to say that the Court's concern in
Utilicorp United was the classification burden of a case-by-case Illinois Brick. If
Congress chooses to create that classification for the courts-as it could through clear
standing rules in telecommunications regarding entrants and consumers-the case-by-
case burden would be avoided. 70
67. Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
68. Id. at 213.
69. Id. at 215.
70. Again, I have not considered here whether Congress has actually done this in the 1996 Act itself on the
question of standing to assert breach of the access duties of the Act.
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V. CONCLUSION
Trinko and the recent courts of appeals decisions that preceded it raise interesting
questions about the intersection of antitrust law and the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
There are some nice questions about how to interweave the substance of the two regimes,
but I have not considered those issues here. Instead, I have focused on the standing issues
posed by a breach of an access obligation. As just a matter of analytics, I think there is
much to be said in favor of calling off the standard Illinois Brick rule in the breach of
access situation. In the extreme case of a full breach of the access duty, there is no way in
which the pass-through idea that supports Illinois Brick can function. Instead, consumers
are harmed through any incremental market power that the incumbent can exercise
because of the competition avoided though the denial of access. Whether we would want
to confer standing on consumers would then depend on making precise what we were
seeking to accomplish through our antitrust remedies-for example, deterrence of breach
versus compensation for those breaches.
That said, the Supreme Court has expressed an understandable reluctance to add
wrinkles to the Illinois Brick doctrine. I do not know exactly how many refinements to
antitrust doctrine we can afford, but I do think that the Supreme Court is well situated to
gauge when enough is enough. That we have already reached that point seems to be the
central message of Utilicorp United, one that comes across sufficiently loudly that even a
relatively tone-deaf academic can hear it.
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